By George W. Harris
What different types of folks can we aspire to be, and the way do our aspirations healthy with our rules of rationality? In Agent-Centered Morality, George Harris argues that almost all people aspire to a undeniable type of integrity: we want to be respectful of and sympathetic to others, and to be loving mom and dad, associates, and contributors of our groups. opposed to a triumphing Kantian consensus, Harris bargains an Aristotelian view of the issues offered through sensible cause, difficulties of integrating all our issues right into a coherent, significant existence in a fashion that preserves our integrity. the duty of fixing those difficulties is "the integration test."Systematically addressing the paintings of significant Kantian thinkers, Harris indicates that even the main complicated modern types of the Kantian view fail to combine all the values that correspond to what we name an ethical lifestyles. by means of demonstrating how the which means of lifestyles and sensible cause are internally similar, he constructs from Aristotle's proposal a conceptual scheme that effectively integrates the entire features that make a existence significant, with out jeopardizing where of any. Harris's elucidation of this procedure is an incredible contribution to debates on human organization, functional cause, and morality.
Read or Download Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism PDF
Similar ethics & morality books
Organisations are less than hearth. rarely an afternoon is going via that government behavior doesn’t look as a subject – or, extra properly, as an issue – within the media. This results in elevated public strain on companies, lots of whom are reacting and publicly assuming their company accountability. This publication represents an creation to and evaluation of the various points of the moral demanding situations confronting businesses this day.
This new number of essays addresses subject matters which are of the most important significance to the lives folks all. do we be rational approximately human existence with out being medical? Is historic figuring out various from medical knowing? Do psychology, faith and aesthetics have their very own types of rationality?
Mele's final goal during this e-book is to aid readers imagine extra truly approximately loose will. He identifies and makes shiny an important conceptual hindrances to justified trust within the life of loose will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the critical matters within the philosophical debate approximately loose will and ethical accountability, criticizes a number of influential modern theories approximately loose will, and develops overlapping conceptions of unfastened will--one for readers who're confident that unfastened will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the opposite for readers who're confident of the other (compatibilists).
Top philosophers discover accountability from numerous views, together with metaphysics, motion concept, and philosophy of legislations.
- Contemporary Moral Philosophy
- The Nature of Evil
- Morality in a Technological World: Knowledge as Duty
- Moral Dilemmas: and other topics in moral philosophy
Additional info for Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism
The evidence suggests, I believe, that there are good grounds for complaint on both sides: the tendency to see everything that is said against one's views as caricature can be as pernicious a form of dismissal as the tendency to caricature itself. The only way to combat both tendencies is with hard philosophical analysis. What I intend to do here is to construct an inquiry regarding the role of regulative norms in practical reason in a way that studiously avoids caricature and argue that recent Kantian defenses fail to consider a very important conceptual alternative to their view.
E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 186–94. ― 37 ― as the appropriate method of adjudicating between rival conceptions of rational agency. To see this, we have to recast the argument in a manner that reframes the issue to allow for the possibility of rationally resolving the question of whether reason alone can motivate. Consider the following argument. 1. The internalism requirement: Practical claims, if they are really to present us with reasons for action, must be capable of motivating rational persons.
If a constructivist model is to be independent of metaphysics and it is to be defensible as practically rational, it will have to show that our deepest moral sentiments provide a basis for practical reason that can sustain ― 49 ― the elements of integrity in the thin sense over time.  For it seems that from the perspective of practical reason, it is always an open question whether independently specifiable moral concerns are among the deepest concerns of our psychology. That they are (on some interpretation of what "moral" concerns are) could be revealed by the integration test.